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Introduction 
 
In face of the burgeoning interest in 
‘ontology’ in science studies, Michael 
Lynch (2008) called for a move toward 
‘ontography’, to talking about 
ontologies by way of studies in which 
ontologies (or at least, an ontology) are 
of demonstrable relevance to the 
doings of those being studied.  
 
This paper provides an ontography, or 
some part of one, in that it reports on 
work in ontology development being 
done by a group of researchers in 
bioinformatics, drawing its examples 
largely from a workshop in which 
some members of that group were 
participant and which was organised 
by a research network to which they 
belonged. Methodologies for building 
‘good’ ontologies were part of the 
interests of this wider research group 
and were a motivation for the work 
undertaken. What  is evident from our 
study is the fact that methods to be 
applied, avenues to be explored and 
even fundamental purposes were all in 
the event ‘up for grabs’ and formed a 
closely interlinked and mutually 
explicating part of the ‘logic in 
practice’ deployed.  
 
We will show how this research work 
was undertaken with reference to an 
existing body of knowledge, yet 
requiring distinctive courses of 
‘discovering work’, concerning both 
method and substantive content. How 
were   its   results   examined   and   re- 
 
 
examined in the light of ongoing, 
evolving and unanticipated 
considerations? Describing how the 
involved participants go about their 
work is, then, ‘an ontography’ in 
precisely the sense that Lynch 
proposes. 
 
Background 
 
Social studies of science having been 
focused on how new contributions gain 
acceptance with scientific communities 
have tended to take for granted the fact 
that natural science investigations are 
conducted against a background of 
accepted and settled findings, without 
giving much emphasis to the way that 
current work is embedded in the 
accumulated results of prior work (for 
an exception, see Sormani, this issue).  
 
With the proliferation of biological 
research and the contribution that it 
makes to the online ‘data deluge’, 
concerns about how to organise, 
manage and access existing data are 
increasingly becoming as significant as 
those of adding to the stock of 
biology’s findings, though the two can 
be connected insofar as it is anticipated 
that ready and effective access to 
biological data stored on line can 
provide a potent opportunity to 
develop biological ideas and generate 
new findings without having to create 
new data. Currently, such ideas are 
largely aspirational. There are 
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developments in the organisation of the 
World Wide Web and other 
technologies that make Merton’s Holy 
Grail of ‘scientific communism’ look 
more realistic than ever, but as yet 
these facilitating technologies have not 
been used to develop the 
computational infrastructures that will 
fully realise this.    
 
‘Finding out’ in numerous forms, 
including the making of discoveries, is 
the front-line work of the natural 
sciences, and, as is well known, but 
relatively seldom documented, front-
line achievements are commonly 
extensively and in detail, dependent 
upon support activities, some dedicated 
to a specific project, some given over 
to developing infrastructures that can 
support one or more genres of 
investigative scientific practice. Like 
other forms of work, scientific work is 
saturated with assessments of 
productivity, ranging from scientists’ 
assessment of the productivity of 
scientific exemplars to administrators’ 
concerns with the returns – however 
defined – yielded by forms of scientific 
effort.    
 
Relatively recent and continuing 
developments incorporating computing 
into scientific work has spurred 
thoughts about the economy of 
scientific investigation, particularly in 
respect of the ever expanding number 
and diversity of scientific 
investigations, and as to whether the 
tying of scientific investigations to 
data-collecting efforts is the most 
productive form of inquiry in times 
when, increasingly, it is possible to 
enable the sharing of data, which in 
turn facilitates the re-use of existing 
data, which re-use may service 
discovering work through the methods 
of computer simulation.   
 
These conceptions are to some extent 
already a reality, but there are 
expectations that their full 
development could quite profoundly 
transform the nature of investigation 
with computational operations 
assuming   greater importance than 
theory or experiment as a means of 
discovery.  This paper attends to some 
work devoted to infrastructure 
development through the formation of 
on-line technologies and tools that 
could, long term, facilitate the re-use of 
data for discovering work (mostly – 
since the work is bioinformatics – in 
respect of biology). This work is 
understood as a part of a much longer 
term development, as relatively early 
work in the development of ontology 
building capacities that will eventually 
enable use of the web for the storage,  
precise identification and recovery of 
all data relative to some specific 
scientific problem.  
 
The bio-informatic work is itself 
innovative in terms of developing 
general methods of ontology building 
to high engineering standards. One 
main aspect of their work is knowledge 
representation through capturing a 
logical structure for some domain of 
classification. Another aspect of that 
work is finding out about the range of 
understandings associated with 
categories used in the relevant domain 
so as to identify some recognisable 
consensus of usage that can be 
incorporated into the representation.  
The workshop used to exemplify some 
of the bioinformaticians’ work was 
explicitly nominated by its convener as 
a means of sociological discovery, 
which was one reason for its being 
recorded. The workshop, involving an 
exercise in collaborative ontology 
building, was a proxy for online 
ontology building ˗ it did not itself 
involve online collaboration ˗ but it 
was a means of discovering something 
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about how collaborative ontology 
building works, what practices it 
involves, what supports it needs, what 
resources it calls upon and so on.  
 
Our case: a bioinformatics 
workshop, ontology-in-practice and 
science studies 
 
The Network Workshop involves 
bioinformaticians and biologists (who 
are often the same persons) engaged in 
such infrastructure work by 
specialising in the development of 
‘ontologies’ which they regard as an 
essential step toward providing 
developed semantic content for Web 
2.0
1
 relevant to the identification and 
recovery of biological data stored on 
line.  
 
‘Web 2.0’ has been associated with 
ambitions to change scientific and 
engineering practice. After all, in 
principle, a world where collaboration 
is possible at the click of a mouse 
means that scientific work can be done 
in a quicker and more efficient manner. 
At exactly the same time, and in 
another feature of Web 2.0, the 
‘semanticization’ of the Web means ˗ 
again, in principle ˗ that the prospect of 
a standardization of concepts is 
possible. If that proves to be the case, 
this ought to have benefits for the 
practitioners involved. It means, inter 
alia, that data from whatever source 
can be used and re-used for 
comparative and other purposes, 
further enabling ‘scientific 
communism’ in and of sharing data. 
 
                                                 
1
 ‘Web 2.0’ is the catchphrase for 
developments in Web design that substantially 
increases the opportunities for ‘user generated 
content’ and the formation of online 
collaborative activities (social networks, video 
sharing sites and the like instantiate these 
developments). 
Though there are some relations 
between ‘ontologies’ of the kind being 
built by computer scientists and the 
traditional philosophical ambitions for 
a scheme that comprehensively 
identifies all the kind of things that 
there are, these are complicated and 
organisationally remote from the kind 
of transactions we will be examining. 
Ontologies in the relevant sense are 
mainly concerned with sorting out the 
organisation of collections of terms 
current in some knowledge domain, 
and primarily for purposes of 
enhancing the computer processing of 
knowledge expressed by those terms. 
More specifically, an ‘ontology’ is an 
organised terminology made up of 
terms drawn from one ‘domain’ or 
another, structuring (some of) the 
terms from the language in use in that 
domain (terms for biological cells, or 
terms for the items stocked in a 
museum, etc., ad infinitum) to provide 
an arrangement that is sufficiently well 
organised that it can be used in search 
engines to make consistent and 
accurate identifications of online 
holdings of  ˗ in many cases  ˗ data, in 
this workshop’s case, of biological 
data.   
 
Much of the structure that is being 
assigned to the biological categories is 
being regulated by the ‘first order 
logic’ (a formal logico-mathematical 
system) that is programmed into the 
technology that participants are using 
as their main ontology building tools. 
The use of first order logic in these 
tools means that each class of objects 
has to be precisely defined and its 
relationship to other classes of objects 
in the same domain equally well-
defined with respect to entailments so 
as to permit the automation of 
inferences.    
 
At its simplest and crudest, the studied 
bioinformaticians’ overall efforts can 
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be understood as attempting to manage 
two sides of their operation. On the 
one side, there is that of designing an 
ontology with a worked out, through-
and-through logical structure, but 
ensuring, at the same time, that the 
terminology being incorporated into 
the structure has an adequate 
relationship to the vocabulary in use 
amongst biological professionals, 
where the meanings of terms is not 
necessarily uniform or unchanging. 
That is, the members of this group are 
doing work that involves both the 
deployment of logic and taking 
decisions about the definitions of terms 
˗ that is, semantics. 
 
As numerous studies of the 
history/sociology of science and 
technology have shown, in principle 
does not mean in practice. There may 
be any number of obstructions to this 
vision of cooperative working. Indeed, 
science and technology studies (STS) 
have demonstrated many times how 
features of organizational and/or 
political infrastructures may prevent 
the easy realisation of these 
possibilities (e.g., Lee, Dourish and 
Mark, 2006; Bietz, Baumer and Lee, 
2010; Ribes and Finholt, 2007; Ribes 
and Lee, 2010). Some of these studies 
show that divisions in science 
sometimes have to do with the 
development and installation of 
classificatory schemes   (Bowker and 
Starr, 1999; Randall, 2001). Less often 
comes the recognition that scientific 
workers of whatever kind may both be 
oriented to these political and 
organizational limitations and may 
actively seek to overcome them.  In the 
case considered here the participants 
understand themselves to be working 
on the formation of infrastructures for 
discovering work in the sciences more 
generally, though one focus for some 
of their concerns is the possibility of 
using ontologies to manage the data 
deluge in biology. They recognise that 
problems of classificatory diversity and 
even of conflict are ones they need to 
handle if an ontology is going to have 
sufficient utility to be taken up within 
the research discipline. 
 
Below, the authors look at a series of 
specific examples of practical 
orientation to classification problems 
from ‘ontology building’. Ontologies 
are seen as one possible remedy to 
classification problems. The data set is 
taken from two three-day meetings   
which bracketed some months of email 
and telephone correspondence.  
 
We do not want to suggest that 
‘ontology building’ in which the 
research group is engaged is a matter 
of taking a developed technology and 
applying it to produce specific 
ontologies on demand (though these 
researchers have a sense of themselves 
as, in some of their work, trying to 
service the interests of specialised 
groups such as biologists or medical 
practitioners by assisting them to build 
an ontology). Rather, they are engaged 
in attempting to develop the 
technology itself, to apply engineering 
methods to improving practices of 
ontology development and design. The 
actual construction of ontologies is, 
from their point of view, commonly a 
troubled work, often undertaken by 
those with little experience in and 
limited understanding of how to put an 
ontology together. As a result, there is 
extensive variation in the quality of the 
existing ontologies that can already, 
and in large numbers, be found online, 
ranging from those that are little used 
and of little use, to ones which are 
relatively well-engineered.  
 
Among the latter the best known and 
most used are ontologies put to 
specifically biological uses. They 
include, for instance, the Gene 
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Ontology (GO), the Phenotype 
Ontology (PATO) and the Chemical 
Entities of Biological Interest 
(CHEBI). All of these are part of the 
Open Biological Ontology (OBO).  
 
Members of the research network 
understandably take a positive view of 
ontologies, but they are aware that 
there is controversy over the value of 
these, and over the philosophical 
foundations of ontological structures, 
not least over the extent and nature of 
relations between philosophers’ and 
engineers’ conceptions of ontologies. 
One of the problems they understand 
to afflict ontology development quite 
generally is the difficulty of building 
on existing work rather than having to 
start all over again. The methods 
applied in the workshop are intended 
as an address to this problem. The 
workshop is re-engineering existing 
ontologies which are recognised as 
ones that are important within biology 
but with logical structures that are open 
to significant improvement.   
     
The practice: ontology building in 
and as ontology articulation 
 
The engagement with ontology 
building amongst those we studied was 
a result of the development and 
combination of, importantly, three 
kinds of computational resources: the 
“Web Ontology Language” (OWL), 
semantic editors such as the one – 
“Protégé” – some of the workshop 
group were involved in developing,  
and semantic reasoners, forms of 
software designed to generate logical 
consequences from inputs. They were 
using these tools in combination to 
create a more methodic basis for 
ontology construction, now at the stage 
where a claimed virtue of their 
procedures was that ontology builders  
need not constantly ‘start from scratch’ 
but could build on and adapt existing 
ontologies or integrate parts from one 
ontology into another.   
 
Much of the work being done on 
ontologies by the research group is 
strategic to the development of 
methods for ontology building, since it 
thinks of itself as possessing tools and 
techniques which can make the sound 
assembly of ontologies a more 
disciplined and dependable matter 
(thus more effectively facilitating its  
“heuristic” upshot). The group is 
heavily involved in methods 
development. It is not, of course, 
undertaking the development of 
ontology building methods from 
scratch, for ontology building has been 
a widespread activity in the 
computational sciences for some time 
(their disciplinary environment of 
biological sciences is already 
populated with numerous ontologies). 
Instead, as suggested, it is adopting 
and adapting tools which make both 
the formation and systematisation of 
fully worked out methods a possibility. 
Their work projects are strategic in the 
sense that tasks are developed on the 
basis of identifying areas of ontology 
building where there are no methods 
for forming ontological structures or 
where there are only cumbersome or 
partially worked out ones.  
 
They make attempts to form novel 
methods for effectively and thoroughly 
dealing with problems in ontology 
building that are recognised as 
routinely producing sub-standard 
ontologies. Their work is very much 
‘tool centred’ in that many of the tasks 
that need methodising are identified by 
contrasting what has been or can be 
done with other tools with what can 
potentially be done with theirs, and so 
their investigations are not so much 
‘how can this be done?’ as ‘how can 
this be done in OWL-Protégé’. These 
bioinformaticians are also advocates 
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for their tools, both through 
demonstrations that these can offer 
effective solutions to more general 
problems in ontology building and 
through providing open instruction as a 
form of capacity building for the use of 
the tools, where the value of the tool is 
understood comparatively – and not 
necessarily invidiously – in relation to 
other ontology building aids.  
 
Many of their tasks provide projects 
for specifically dedicated research 
teams, but the instance that provides 
our example here is the product of an 
academic research network. As we’ve 
discussed at length elsewhere (see 
Randall et al., 2011) and will briefly 
need to consider below, their tool and 
method development naturally 
involves an orientation to users, 
possible and actual, with the 
researchers, often being biologists as 
well as informaticians, to some extent 
acting as users themselves, which is 
what they are going to do in the 
network meeting discussed shortly.  
 
Nevertheless, their deliberations entail 
working out in situ what users, for 
what purposes, need to be considered 
in order that the ontology can be 
redefined and adequately 
circumscribed, for ontologies need 
boundaries in order to be ‘usable’. In 
so doing, this group will attempt to 
specify the limits of the ontology by, 
inter alia, specifying what use it might 
be put to and working out what relation 
it might have to other ontologies in the 
OBO Foundry. In essence, the OBO 
(the Open Biological Ontology) 
provides a good example for them to 
work with, since it involves biology.  
Also, it features sub-ontologies such as 
the Cell Type which is of a 
manageable size for the task they have 
in mind, and the less-well developed 
aspects of that ontology provide an 
opportunity to try out their methods.    
Examples: methodising and 
normalising CTO 
 
We illustrate the paper by looking 
firstly at the beginnings of a workshop 
(projected as the first of two) to 
conduct ‘an experiment’ in 
‘collaborative normalization’ of the 
Cell Type Ontology (CTO). The 
experimental status assigned to it 
reflects the fact that it is as much an 
exercise to find out what needs to be 
done in normalising an ontology as it is 
to improve the Cell Type Ontology as 
such. Subsequently we consider some 
of the normalising work done in 
stabilising findings, ironing out 
inconsistencies, reworking policies on 
inclusion and exclusion, and so on. 
The parties are all ‘biologists of some 
sort’ (except Dave Randall who was 
present more as observer than 
participant) but most of them are 
involved as bioinformaticians and are 
familiar with the general ontology 
building tools that are to implement 
‘the process of normalisation’.   
 
The selection of the CTO is not due to 
any specific significance or priority of 
cell typing in biology, but because the 
ontology is a good candidate for this 
kind of exercise  ˗ it is, according to 
the convenor of the group (P1), ‘hand 
crafted’ (by a small number of people) 
as opposed to systematically 
constructed by some process of 
community consensus and it is to be 
expected that there will be ‘errors’ 
(which most likely intends 
‘inconsistencies’) that are a product of 
its method of construction (hand 
crafting), which expectation is 
documented by P1’s prior work2: 
 
                                                 
2
 These transcripts are edited. We have 
sometimes used square brackets ([    ]) to 
indicate more substantial excisions. 
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P1: I want to take the OBO cekk type 
ontology which is a hand-crafted er  
taxonomy of cell types [  ] it’s a 
multiple hierarchy its er what AR 
would  describe  er as a tangle 
 
P2: (  )horrifying 
 
P6:  It isn’tr pretty 
 
P1: what tends to happen when you 
build ontologies by hand is that you 
will will make mistakes [   ]. what we 
have discovered is that one in ten of 
the classes has a missing or 
erroneous subsumption relationship 
on it and the process of 
normalisation is supposed to give 
you er modules reusable modules 
more maintainable lumps of 
hierarchy a- and more  highly 
axiomatised ontologies what are 
 
P2: wha 
 
P1: highly axiomatised er  
 
P2: yes yes 
 
P1: there's more stuff in them more 
stuff in them so that you can make 
more computational inferences and 
essentially it does all the work. 
 
A major finding was that there are 
substantial failings, i.e. in one tenth of 
cases, where the ‘subsumption 
relation’ (which is a key relationship 
between categories and subcategories 
in the hierarchy of categories that is the 
backbone of the ontology) is either 
unspecified or wrongly stated. The 
CTO is also selected, as P1 explains in 
response to P2’s direct question ‘why 
the CTO?’ because it has features 
which make it manageable for the 
projected exercise ˗ it is small enough, 
its domain is focussed, there is an 
expert in cell biology in the group (and 
more join at a later stage), etc. 
 
Methodising ontology building: 
Logical engineering 
 
As explained above, the problematic 
for this group of researchers is not the 
construction of ontologies as such, but 
of eventually enabling the routine 
construction of ‘quality’ ontologies.  
Their work is not centrally focussed on 
meeting the demand for ontologies 
from any particular constituency, but 
concerned with developing, 
standardising and automating the skills 
of ontology building.   
 
As the convenor indicates early in the 
meeting, “the answer to the question, 
how do you build good ontologies is 
usually ‘the way we did it’”. They 
seek, in other words, to contribute to 
the testing and assessment of some of 
their relatively untried development 
methods – that of ‘normalisation’ 
being prominent in this case. In the 
first instance they begin by deploying 
someone else’s software, the  
“OntoClean” methodology (Guarino 
and Welty, 2002). OntoClean embeds a 
series of logical principles which can 
operate to force a more logical 
structure into the design of an 
ontology’s structure, not least by 
providing means of perspicuously 
surveying the structure of the 
ontology-so-far and ordering it by 
defined principles. Such a method 
should allow for the definition of clear 
‘primitives’ in the ontology and for 
clear subsumption hierarchies to be 
effectively derived from them.
3
 
 
                                                 
3
 Primitives are the ‘roots’ of any given 
ontology and cannot be defined by relating 
them to any other part of the ontology, except 
through axiomatic relationships with other 
primitives. Primitives in one ontology are not 
necessarily primitives in another. 
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What has happened is that P1 and a 
colleague (P4) have previously run the 
existing CTO through a computerised 
reasoner in order to highlight the 
omissions and logical inconsistencies 
that are being spoken about. Reasoners 
are extremely important in this kind of 
work because they are a means to 
check work done, and it is one maxim 
of the work that checks for consistency 
should be run frequently when 
assembling an ontology to pick up on 
inconsistencies as they are introduced 
into the ontology’s structure and before 
further structures are built on them. 
This maxim reflects two other well-
known features of the work: first, that 
those making entries without 
automated support won’t be able, 
unaided, to track the consistency of the 
entries they are making and thus will 
unavoidably introduce anomalies into 
the hierarchy they are designing, and, 
second, that it is much easier to repair 
design errors before other structures 
have been built on them.   
 
Though the members of the group have 
some understanding of ontology 
building, this knowledge is unevenly 
distributed and some members of the 
group  raise  a number of questions 
that may help them understand what 
they are doing and how to do it. Thus: 
 
P1: from what I understand and P6 
might well know more is that the erm 
OBO people have commissioned a 
reworking of the cell type 
ontologyerm and I am perfectly 
happy for this to be a contribution to 
that process but that is not something 
I will manage... cause the whole 
process embodied in that would just 
drive me up the wall... 
 
P6: so maybe I could comment very 
briefly on that we’ve been using the 
cell type ontology [  ] before this 
workshop we started to look at the 
hierarchy, but the fact that lots of 
things are not defined, they know 
there are lots of missing ‘is a’ 
relationships back to the root that 
they’re addressing [   ] They had a 
discussion about should they rebuild 
the whole thing again from scratch 
take out all the hierarchy and just 
start again. 
 
P2: who is ‘they’ in this context? 
 
P6: people active are [gives a list of 
names]. The CTO doesn’t have like a 
paid person to look after it so 
originally it was [gives other names] 
and now it’s just sitting there in no 
man’s land... 
 
P2: but that no man’s land is located 
over in [location]... 
 
P6: No not particularly, though most 
of those people are over in the US X 
is in [location]...  right now, Y is in 
[location] too... I don’t know where 
Z is...  
 
There is here a recognition that work 
may well be ongoing on the part of the 
‘owners’ of the  CTO, work which will 
have some consequences for what this 
group is undertaking, especially as P2 
indicates that the work may have ‘real 
world’ and immediate benefits. It 
becomes evident that understanding the 
nature of the existing CTO 
development and user communities’ 
commitments has implications for the 
group’s own purposes. Initial work, 
then, involves an assessment of the 
‘state of play’ with CTO. That 
implicates a set of practical interests in 
addition to the implied political 
considerations of the above: 
P6: I would like to use the cell type 
ontology for my own uses n one one 
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of which is tying all of the available 
public cell lines that we have data on 
and getting a type for them in the cell 
type ontology 
 
P2:  Yes yes 
            [ 
P6:     and making something cross-
product which is really something 
that needs to be done and if we do 
that that could be something that 
would be really useful and  that’s 
something that [gives name] and I 
have sort of somewhere on our list of 
what we need...  
 
It progressively becomes clear that 
issues of method cannot be dealt with 
independently of substantive issues 
concerning the scope, size and 
boundaries of the ontology, all of 
which relate in turn to purported usage 
and which have to be practically fixed 
relative to the work in hand. 
 
There are strong sociological 
tendencies to be suspicious of talk of 
logic (because of its association with 
doctrines about rationality, among 
other reasons) and, in the extreme, to 
treat it as an extrinsic feature of 
reasoning that is invoked only in 
retrospective justification of courses of 
action that were actually assembled 
without concern for intrinsic logical 
structure. Such arguments are a legacy 
of the idea that formal logical schemes 
represent the general process of 
thought, and a reaction against it, with 
the result that questions about the role 
of logic are treated as if they are a 
priori ones.  
 
This paper does not propose any 
general view of the nature of logic but 
follows, rather, the precedent of  
Harold Garfinkel who repeatedly 
recommends to treat terms such as 
‘logic’ to a large extent as place-
holders for an array of as-yet-
underdescribed activities, and this 
paper is an exercise in looking to see 
how ‘logical reasoning’ is done in an 
actual case, with the participants in the 
workshop  facing two interdependent 
questions, how to set up a logically 
tidy general structure for their  
ontology as a whole, and how to site 
instances effectively within that 
structure. 
 
Normalising built ontologies 
 
An ontology, in its simplest terms, can 
be understood as an ordered 
construction of categories that are 
intended to capture a domain of 
phenomena and, at the same time, or, 
much the same thing, to express a form 
of expertise (compare with definition 
on pp. 106-107). This work is, after all, 
understood as a branch of ‘knowledge 
engineering’ or, as we treat it here, 
logic-in-practice.  
 
This explicit orientation to problems of 
logic-in-practice is evident in 
discussions about method and, in 
particular, the stabilisation or, as we 
shall see, the “normalisation” of its 
results: 
 
P1: What I’m hoping that we will be 
able  to do in identifying the primary 
axis is actually do this somewhat fo- 
formally and use one aspect of 
something called Ontoclean [      ] So 
what Ontoclean does [     ] but 
whats- erm  ontoclean is a way of 
evaluating erm particularly 
subsumption relationships in 
ontologies and checking that you’ve 
said the right thing  in the right way 
and it talks about unity, rigidity and 
identity and er unity is all about 
whether you’re talking about parts 
and wholes cos one of the common 
mistakes is to talk about erm part-
whole relationships as ‘is a’ 
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relationships er erm famously, ocean 
is a kind of water where water is part 
of ocean [   ] identity is all about 
necessity and sufficiency which I 
hope that, being OWL people, you’re 
all reasonably familiar with [    ]  
Rigidity is talking about things which 
are inherent to ummm  ah ah th- th- 
the essence of things so wha er what  
are properties held by an entity for 
the duration of its existence or only 
for part of its existence. So I’m a 
person from the beginning of my 
existence to the end of my existence 
but I’m a student for only a portion 
of that time [    ] And what we want 
to do or what we should do is identify 
the primary axis of classification to 
be a rigid property and helps us we 
are told to make a nice safe tree 
 
In these comments, formal logic is 
very much in use as a tool providing 
the initial procedural basis for the 
work. The objective of their 
methodological efforts is to provide a 
means for assuring a through-and-
through logical structure for built 
ontologies, and hence to provide means 
that facilitate the further through-and-
through logical expansion of the 
specimen ontology that they are 
proposing to rebuild. The problem is 
the first one mentioned by P1, that of 
‘tangle’, and that is to be addressed 
through a process of ‘normalisation’.    
 
Local disentangling 
 
One of the forms of logical structure 
that is central to the categorical 
hierarchy is the notion of ‘inheritance’, 
whether the properties characteristic of 
units at one level of the hierarchy are 
also possessed (inherited by) lower 
levels in the hierarchy. It is easy to see 
that many things can be simplified, for 
many purposes, if it can be assumed 
that many things remain fixed (and that 
no new things are added) throughout 
movement up and down the hierarchy.  
It is a feature of the language, 
however, that a subcategory has 
relations to more than one 
superordinate category, and it is a 
perfectly reasonable thing, if 
attempting to organise the collection of 
terms in a domain ˗ this group often 
use Pizzas as a training example ˗ to 
attempt to express all the relationships 
between categories in a single 
hierarchy, and thus to associate a 
subcategory with more than one 
superordinate category.    
 
One of the standard engineering 
methods that the team are using is that 
of ‘modular’ construction, the design 
of parts of the overall construction so 
that they are extensively independent 
of one another. Modularisation is 
understood as a way of facilitating 
maintenance of the developed system 
by enabling changes to be made that 
can be contained within the module 
without ramifying throughout the 
whole structure. Here it is the lines of 
inheritance that are being treated as 
desirably modular units, with 
subcategories being associated with 
only one superordinate category so that 
the subcategory’s relation to other 
superordinate categories can be 
assigned to segregated modules.   
 
The failure to make such separations 
and the work of decomposing a 
hierarchy that has not been 
systematically modularised (that of 
CTO, in this case) results for the need 
for what they call ‘normalising’.  The 
point of such normalising (as indicated 
above) is that, when properly done, it 
enables reasoners (or people) to 
present clearly defined and unilinear 
subsumption hierarchies. It is, put 
simply, ‘untangling’ work, 
decomposing the CTO’s hierarchy into 
independent lines. So the workshop 
group is trying out and learning about 
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modularising in Protégé OWL which 
will also be facilitated by learning 
about how their proposed methodology 
and the use of their tools can service 
the task in hand.   
 
Attention to the structure as a whole is 
also manifested in considerations of 
how to start on reworking the existing 
structure. An initial concern is to find 
an axis which will function as the 
‘trunk’ of the tree-like structure. In 
effect, this means trying to find some 
property which all cells have in 
common such that they can be defined 
as cells in the first place, and 
subsequently organised into 
subordinate  ‘types’. This is 
undertaken ‘conversationally’ in the 
sense that participants have to think 
about whether they can identify such a 
characteristic. This leads them into 
considering what kinds of ‘cells’ they 
want to include within their domain – 
do they want to include cells created in 
the laboratory rather than only those 
occurring naturally? Do they wish to 
include primitive cell types associated 
with yeast? They decide against this on 
grounds of time and competence, as 
shown below.   
 
Negotiating classification 
 
In some ways, the ontology that they 
are reworking can be considered a 
completed construction – it is an 
ontology of cells, but, as can be seen, 
there is room for negotiations about 
how complete the CTO needs to be. 
Decisions, that is, need to be made 
about ’where to start’. First decisions 
relate to what to include and what to 
exclude, at least for the workshop’s 
purposes: what sorts of cells need to be 
included, what sorts of cells can   
practically be  included in relation to 
the workload. Placement of the tasks is 
in relation to both the embedding 
logical structure and the organisation 
and schedule of the building team. 
Thus: 
 
P3: let’s think about the purpose of 
this [ ] if the purpose of this is to 
classify cell types in multi-cellular 
organisms that’s what we should 
classify and forget the rest... 
 
P1: ummm  
 
P3: we don’t need to classify cell 
types in yeast 
 
P1: we haven’t made that decision 
yet ummm we might have done 
[laughter] 
 
P2: from a purely data point of 
view... 80% of our data is eukaryot 
[complex cells with membranes 
around them - most living things - 
nucleus inside the membrane] not 
prokaryot [mainly single cell 
organisms, no nucleus] and you do 
very different kinds of experiments 
with prokaryot it’s almost never 
about cell type ...  
 
So, there are early examples of 
decisions about what to 
include/exclude from the ontology and 
why, and about where to place things 
within the ontology. A series of ways 
in which organisms can be generally 
classified by looking at high-level 
ways of characterising the properties of 
cells is proposed: 
 
P2: cell by organisim could be a 
candidate for one axis 
 
P3: cell by function ... 
P2: Cell by histology,  a 
classification by their microscopic- 
We think this is incomplete and what 
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cell by histology means  it’s basically 
morphology or stainability  
The point about this is that the 
identification of axes is a way of 
rectifying the ‘tangle’ of logical 
inconsistencies uncovered by the 
reasoner. The original version of the 
CTO, it seems, does not spell these, 
and other, properties out. It is 
complained, for instance, that in the 
prior version, cells are listed as 
‘mature’ and ‘immature’ which does 
not in and of itself provide for any 
properties which might otherwise 
distinguish them.   
Restrictive inclusion 
 
The consequence of the above 
ambition, using the metaphor of the 
tree structure, is that the ‘leaves’ (i.e 
the identifiable kinds of cells finally 
subsumed into the classificatory 
system) would be the least difficult 
part of the logical work. If the main 
structure of axes can be derived then 
populating it should be easy (or at 
least, can be the result of empirical 
work, not logical work). Suffice it to 
say that the search is unsuccessful. No 
rigid property can be found. This 
means that a different method needs to 
be applied: 
 
P4: I think we may have got to the 
point where we cannot find a 
primitive axis..  
 
P1: well, in that case we go for the 
ultra normalisation [  ] of doing it all 
by restriction so my current proposal 
is that we just have cell and we list 
all the actual cells underneath... 
 
P5: so if we just have cell, are we 
making the assumption that 
everything in the cell type ontology 
hang under cell so cell functions or 
processes would not be a type of cell, 
so we should have more than one 
upper level we need classes as well 
as cells... 
 
P3: we need types of function... 
 
P5: we need a process hierarchy 
 
P1: which, funnily enough, we have 
in GO so are we happy that we just 
have cell and do it all by restriction? 
 
P5: well, not happy, but we haven’t 
found any property that we can treat 
as rigid... 
 
The group looks for an alternative way 
of deriving a viable structure, 
envisaging different procedures: 
 
P5: so then our assumption would be 
that we put a load of cell types under 
cell and our hope would be that there 
will be none that can only be 
inferred. 
 
P2: it’s just a question of 
completeness, isn’t it? there are still 
things sitting there, it means we 
haven’t got properties we can find 
enough to build a good enough 
hierarchy, but actually it’s a more 
tractable problem and actually we 
could do this by picking some 
sensible cell types representative of 
plants and animals circulatory and 
secretory it gives us a pretty good go 
at the restrictions... 
 
P1: if we just go and pick twenty  and 
just do the restrictions and then go 
back and generalise [ ] what I 
propose now is that we assign some 
tasks that people can go and do  
someone can go away and select 
twenty... 
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P2: we can do that collaboratively 
now [   ] 
 
P1: can someone write this down... 
one task is to select twenty or so of 
actual cells which give us a 
representative spread, one is to go 
away and find something that talks 
about morphology, process, nuclear 
number, most of these are going to 
be PATO by the way... ploidy, 
lineage we probably don’t need to 
bother with because it’s all there... 
and then there’s organism... 
[P2. Notes them all down] 
 
At the lower end of the ontology there 
are ‘the leaves’ (i.e. the cells 
themselves) and the decision now is to 
take ‘twenty or so’ representative cells 
in order to populate the ontology but 
without trying to establish any 
significant degree of hierarchy (which 
means that little or no automatic 
reasoning can be done). Doing the 
work ‘by restriction’ entails a 
differently ordered kind of logical 
work. Here, what will be attempted is 
the classification of cells by defining 
certain kinds of logical relationship 
they have
4
.  
 
The point about representativeness is 
important, in that ‘writing restrictions’ 
is a way of identifying the individual 
members of a class in terms of the 
properties that they have, not by 
enumerating the individuals, but by 
specifying a property that they need to 
be counted in the class. Doing this will 
also require attention to what already 
exists. The group is aware that some of 
these relationships are already defined 
                                                 
4
 For a more complete description, see 
http://owl.cs.manchester.ac.uk/tutorials/protege
owltutorial/resources/ProtegeOWLTutorialP4_
v1_1.pdf  
 
in other ontologies and they will need 
to interrogate them:    
 
P1: all connected are we? So, what ... 
we’ve now got 25 candidate terms ... 
next stage is to go and find bits of 
supporting ontology for dealing with 
the other axes of classification as 
identified this morning, as in function 
or process, taxonomy, morphology, 
staining, lineage, anatomy, but we’ll 
put anatomy to one side. 
 
P2: you wanted the list of cross 
products 
 
P1: yes, supporting ontologies 
 
P2:  morphology, process, nuclear 
number, ploidy, lineage, organism, 
size, maturity, anatomy, sex, embryo, 
proximity, location, potentiality... 
 
P1: can we sort that list into PATOs? 
 
P2: doing it now 
 
P1: now pairs of us can look at these 
things ... two pairs to look at PATO 
and the rest look at GO process... so 
what we need to do for PATO is 
whether the terms are there and then 
how they’ve done it to see whether  it 
actually has the classification that 
will give us what we need for 
instance, it used to be the case that 
ploidy was just a flat list  and 
maturity and immaturity might just 
not be there So when we go through 
the cell types, we might look at 
components but for the moment just 
go through the processes look for 
things like insulin secretion in GO. 
 
What to do with cases?  
 
Though the participants are biologists 
and have varying degrees of familiarity 
with the tools in use in the workshop, 
there are numerous occasions for 
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discussing and deciding about how to 
enter cases into the accumulating 
collection of categories. An example of 
bears on the nature of the relation that 
the scheme will say that two kinds of 
cells have to each other: 
P3: here's a lot of thought into 
development A  B and C. Can you 
comment? Stem cell divides to be a 
stem cell and a daughter cell that 
differentiates - myoblasts fuse to be a 
multinucleate muscle fibre, process of 
change has been considered. 
P1: if I am correct all blood cells 
from hm stem cells may want to say 
hm stem cell  erthyrocyte, assumes 
that all  at least one erthrocyte, not 
true want to say it the other way 
around, erythrocyte develops from 
hm stem cell. We need a discussion 
on whether stem cells are immortal in 
this context.  
The issue here is about how to express 
relations of succession where one thing 
changes into two (A ARROW B and C) 
which query is exampled by a stem cell 
that divides into two, another stem cell 
of the same kind and a different kind of 
cell to that one. P1, the primary 
specialist in ontologies present, does 
not have a direct answer to the 
question but presents an issue which is, 
effectively, that of how the criterion of 
‘same’ is to be used in such a context. 
Is the stem cell which results from the 
division a different cell from the initial 
stem cell: hence ‘whether stem cells 
are immortal in this context’, i.e. 
whether one of the two daughters of 
the stem cell, which is itself a stem cell, 
is to be counted as more of that initial 
cell or something different from it?  
This is not a matter to be decided at 
independently of other decisions about 
the structure of the hierarchy, in this 
instance on relating to hierarchically 
superior dimensions, as the following 
exchange suggests:  
P2: is this a question of temporal 
processes and how we model those?  
P3: no more about modelling change, 
RS said that he is a person, and was a 
student, how do we model a myoblast 
that has become a multinucleic  
muscle fibre  
Commonplace examples such as that 
of ‘is a person and was a student’ are 
regularly appealed to in explaining the 
idea behind classification arrangements, 
so that there are general issues about 
how to treat cases where one thing 
changes into another, with the example 
of someone becoming a student being a 
reminder that they do not thereby 
become a different person. This makes 
the issue in hand less a question of 
how to classify successive stages in a 
lifecycle, and more one of dealing with 
the kind of change involved when one 
thing – the myoblast is an embryonic 
form of muscle cell – changes into 
something else.    
Resuming hierarchisation, 
correcting mistakes 
 
The group reconvenes for a second 
meeting (after several months). In the 
interim, a substantial amount of work 
has been done by the pairs proposed 
above, and more than two hundred 
cells have now been defined according 
to various properties. The goals of this 
second meeting are articulated as: 
 
P1: [we need to]check some of the 
biology and particularly our usage of 
the GO process ontology  we need to 
plan where we need to get to and in 
particular how we’re going to 
validate the normalised ontology 
artefact we’ve produced [     ] so we 
developed a schema and set up a 
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series of spreadsheets to describe the 
properties [   ] and we filled out the 
values using various supporting 
ontologies like GO process, PATO, 
the cellular component ontology, 
FMA  What M. has set up is a series 
of scripts which will take these 
spreadsheets and generate the OWL 
encodings and build the ontology by 
a pipeline    
The sociology of science is inclined to 
treat the lack of stability in scientific 
work as its discovery ˗ something that 
would be counterintuitive to scientists 
themselves if they were to recognise it. 
What is evident, we think, in the work 
we are describing, is that the 
contingent nature of the work is 
routinely recognised, the validity of 
statements about logical properties is 
explicitly adjudicated against 
institutional and professional purposes, 
and questions are not treated as settled 
except insofar as they meet the specific 
purposes at hand. Put simply, doing 
logic-in-practice involves exhibiting 
exactly the kind of routine corrective 
work that is treated only ironically in 
some versions of STS.   
The group (the membership of which 
has been increased by two members 
who bring specific expertise) begins by 
looking at contractile cells (cells which 
contract, such as muscle cells), 
information about which has been 
gathered by one of the group members. 
The work being done here is that of 
setting out the hierarchy that was 
initially missing. Again, this work is 
complex, and involves both the 
resolution of ambiguities and decisions 
about the ‘best’ way to code matters in 
the light of evolved purposes:  
P5: yeah, OK ... this is it [on screen] 
start with the fast muscle cell ... on 
the top you see annotations ... I 
believe the process was put in by P2. 
P2: yes, that’s one of mine ... 
P3: can I make very general 
comments [  ]when we’re considering 
contractile cells  there will be certain 
cells which are clearly not muscle  
hair cells in the inner ear used for 
hearing are known to [gestures] 
contract at high frequency, 
fibroblasts remodel the extra cellular 
matrix by contracting and pulling  so, 
while a myoepithelial cell is a sort of 
muscle cell as well as sort of 
secretory cell, there are others which 
are, you can argue, that  are clearly 
not muscle, that can contract, so one 
thing we need to make clear, you can 
be a contractile cell without being a 
muscle cell. 
P2: I think that is ... I think there 
aren’t many ... but there’s at least 
one 
P3: the second thing is that we need 
some synonyms... cell biologists don’t 
talk about fast muscle cells, they talk 
about muscle fibres or myofibres ... 
P1: I don’t know how rich the OBO 
version of the cell type ontology was 
but the OBO format has a mechanism 
separate from the textual definitions 
for doing various forms of synonym  
which if they’re there, will just be 
transferred over but you are entirely 
right  
Of course, this process also entails the 
routine identification and correction of 
mistakes. Sometimes, they are easily 
agreed and rectified but not always, for 
deciding upon what a ‘mistake’ is will 
not always be unproblematic. Firstly, 
there will be different kinds of mistake. 
For instance, some mistakes might be 
thrown up by the reasoner after 
decisions have been  made and agreed: 
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P2: could we just look at all the 
children of contractile cells? 
 
P5: [runs reasoner].  
 
P2: I just want to see all the child 
term leaf nodes of contractile... 
 
P3: flight muscle cell, that’s 
interesting  no, a cardiac muscle cell 
is not a skeletal muscle cell!! 
 
P6: a flight muscle cell is never a 
cardiac muscle cell 
 
P7: it’s a sib of skeletal  it’s got that 
right it’s just a contractile cell, which 
is right ... 
 
P2: but the display looks wrong ... 
 
P7: [goes to board, points fingers to 
each term] 
 
P8: we’re looking at cardiac, the 
highlighted one 
 
P7: oh, we agree that’s wrong  
 
P2: so that’s a good one to look at if 
it’s wrong 
 
Corrective work is the main part of 
what is done at this late stage. As 
classification decisions evolve what 
was once ‘right’ may now need 
revision; original assumptions may 
have been entirely wrong; there may be 
sins of omission, or poor or careless 
input work (which nevertheless 
impacts on the capacity of the reasoner 
to function). In any event corrective 
work is done by those who know and 
know how:  
 
P6: Pericyte you’ve got it wrong ... 
I’ve just been looking it up on the 
web it’s been used here as an 
example of a single smooth muscle 
cell on a blood vessel that is out of 
date, it’s now known to be a primitive 
cell form, undifferentiated, I found 
two references to this just now, it can 
differentiate into, one, a macrophage, 
a fibroblast or a single smooth 
muscle cell, so it develops into, it 
develops into, I can give you the 
reference for this   
 
P1: how have we got it axiomatically 
described? 
 
P5: yeah, its ‘located in’ blood 
vessels, ‘participates in’ 
angiogenesis, and ‘participates in’ 
blood vessel and ‘participates in’ 
organisation of an anatomical 
structure   
 
P1: so we’re saying all this is wrong 
[on screen is description of pericyte 
with GO IDs]… 
 
Exigencies of Logical and Semantic 
Work 
 
We have shown how the articulation of 
semantic judgements and logical 
formalisations are mutually elaborated 
in two stages of a workshop designed 
to try out a relatively unused method, 
normalisation, in the design of an 
ontology. The work in hand is 
exploratory, and the first phase very 
much involves provisional moves as 
those present try to work out, often 
conjointly, how they are to proceed 
and to begin identifying candidate 
structures for the ontology they aim to 
(re)build, already attentive to the 
potential such structures have for both 
logical expansion and for adding to or 
alleviating the eventual burden of 
work. In the later phase of the work, a 
partially developed structure is in 
place, one that can be assessed to see if 
it has turned out to be the one that they 
were intending to design. The kinds of 
semantic issues arising relate, of 
course, to the order of the work-in-
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hand, different questions arising in the 
earlier phase, when decisions are being 
made about how to identify and order 
axes for the ontology (and where the 
live issue was whether any effective 
axes could be identified or whether an 
alternative, more laborious method of 
developing the classification ‘through 
restrictions’ was to be used), to those  
arising later when working through the 
consequences of  having adopted  
certain axes. 
 
It is quite characteristic of this work 
that stable, complete and unchallenged 
definitions of classes, properties and 
relations in the ontology in question 
are consciously and deliberately 
postponed, since the structure being 
build is a network of 
interdependencies, and the finalisation 
of one decision often awaits fixing of 
other decisions
5
.    
 
This called for questions about what 
terms would form the metalanguage in 
which the revised ontology might 
express the domain terms, and whether 
the transformation of the overall 
structure would change the meaning of 
or displace terms from the original’s 
metalanguage.   
 
We have tried to show how practical 
semantic and logical work is attendant 
upon the various problems confronted 
at different times in the ontology 
building process, and in so doing at 
                                                 
5
 We’ve discussed elsewhere the work of 
‘elicitation’ in which ontology builders engage 
to help in the initial identification of the 
vocabulary to be included in the ontology (see 
Lin et al., 2007), something which was not 
necessary for this exercise, since the CTO 
already provides that, but this did not and does 
not eliminate the need for decisions as to what 
biological terms should be included in the 
ontology, and the task of reconfiguring the 
overall structure of the cell ontology.  
 
 
least intimate some of the dimensions 
of the ontology building task (at this 
stage of the builders’ work) through 
displaying some of the steps involved 
in articulating biological terminologies 
with the requirements of the ontology’s 
developing structure. One thing which 
needs to be emphasised is that much of 
what is going on is that formal 
ontology building rules (such as those 
of OntoClean) are not understood to 
supply automatic determinations of 
how some item of terminology is to be 
correctly classified, treating such 
determinations as matters for decision 
by the users of the tools in their work 
as designers of an ontology.  Since the 
work on this occasion is in reworking 
an ontology, many of the questions 
addressed have to do with 
understanding the principles that the 
CTO ontology had employed and with 
whether these were to be preserved or 
modified in the reconstruction.   
 
This work, then, can be seen as 
confronting a series of quite practical 
problems which even experts must 
confront on a quite routine basis. These 
are not by any means all ones of formal  
logic in the sense that there are failures 
in their understanding of first order 
logic’s  principles, but problems in the 
sense that logical procedures require 
implementation and instantiation. 
These are dealt with in an ordered 
fashion. That is, at each point, 
members of the group identify what 
their problem is, whether it is a 
problem of structure, of semantics, or 
some combination of the two, what 
they are to do about it at this time and 
in this case and what their rationale 
might be for making these decisions.  
 
In the mutually elaborating nature of 
this logical and semantic work, one 
thing is clear – the work is the work of 
classification. Classification can be 
treated in a somewhat trivial way in the 
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literature, exemplifying as we have 
suggested the ‘discovery’ of 
instabilities or (see Bowker and Star, 
1999) used contrastively to show how 
classifications both have formal 
properties and entail work to produce 
them.  
 
What is seldom pointed out is that this 
work has no generic features –
classification is not done 
independently of the conditions of its 
production. There is a world of 
difference between a classification 
system for mental illness, such as the 
DSM-IV, and the work that is being 
done in ontology production. It has 
been remarked on a number of 
occasions that the classification of 
mental illnesses can entail vagueness, 
overlap and confusion (see, e.g., Healy, 
2002; Lane, 2007; Kirsch, 2010). It is 
nevertheless commonly used by 
practitioners for   diagnostic purposes. 
In contrast, the work of ontology 
production is precise work. It cannot 
be anything else because anything less 
than worked through classifications 
will merely cause the mechanised 
reasoner to signal errors. Now this 
does not mean that issues must be 
resolved, definitions must be 
universally agreed, and so on. It means 
instead that the work must be done in 
precise relation to the categories 
inherent in any ontology – those of 
instance, class, property, relationship, 
value, and so on. The work, in other 
words, entails orienting domain 
knowledge – in this case, knowledge of 
cells and their characteristics – into the 
language of formal logic.   
 
What is noticeable in our data is how 
P1, the leader of the group,  is 
extensively the authority who 
adjudicates questions about the proper 
logical form, usually by supplying 
illustrations to explain how these 
things are to be modelled.  The parties 
have some familiarity with the 
ontological scheme but not necessarily 
of the kind that lets them enter into the 
work directly. They need some 
reminding of how the categorical 
scheme works, of prominent and 
relevant features of classification – 
invocation of upper level ontologies ‘à 
la BFO’ (Basic Formal Ontology), 
which instantiate a couple of stock 
problems in deciding how to enter 
things – particularly those of 
identifying inherent properties, part-
whole relations and so on.  Members 
of the group (to a varying degree) are 
familiar with various types of cell and 
how those cells are typically described 
in the world of biology. What they are 
engaged in, however, is the 
transformation of these typicalities into 
statements which are ontological 
statements. 
 
This is not just a matter of deciding 
how to make entries into a formed 
ontology, but on how to form the axes 
of the redesigned ontology, so that at 
this juncture, the queries are not about 
which existing category is this instance 
to be assigned to but what kind of 
category would be needed to provide 
space such that this (and other 
expectable) case(s) can be included 
with the scheme. 
 
This is clear in the way in which the 
meeting participants oriented, guided 
by P1, to the principle of ‘rigidity’ in 
the first instance as a means to begin 
the structuring process. ‘Rigidity’ is 
about differentiating properties which 
are ‘essential’ to the identity of some 
object and properties which are not 
essential, a difference made in the 
Ontoclean vocabulary which contrasts 
rigid with anti-rigid characteristics.  
Parties are nevertheless alert to the 
decisional status of their categories: 
each cell classification is a design 
decision of their ontology, and it can 
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be recognised that alternative decisions 
are possible. Such decisions are, of 
course, not arbitrary but are made in 
accordance with assumptions about 
what the problems are and who is best 
suited to solving them. These are 
innumerable negotiated outcomes.  
 
These matters of course involve 
variations across the participants, 
broadly about difference between 
knowledge of ontology-principles or 
about biological phenomena, both of 
which are themselves unevenly 
distributed: P1 is an ontology specialist 
and is something of an authority on the 
general task, as well as on the rules of 
ontology building.  There are varying 
degrees of knowledgeability in these 
matters, but there is also 
knowledgeability about biology 
generally and about cell types 
specifically, so a lot of these are 
queries to which there is a ready 
answer. Some, however, are queries 
which may have different answers, and 
yet others are queries that can’t be 
answered now or yet.  
Conclusion 
Our study deals only with a few brief 
instances from a workshop that 
involved four full days of meetings as 
well as a practically unquantifiable 
amount of additional work, which 
workshop is only a small part of quite 
long term efforts at the development of 
an online technology. These brief 
moments are dense with specific 
understandings of a host of 
practicalities, and the materials of a 
plurality of disciplines which are 
somewhat unevenly distributed 
amongst the participants, though not in 
ways which create notable difficulties 
amongst them, the more worrisome 
troubles, as we have suggested, 
residing in the ways which what they 
‘know’ articulates with the 
understandings of those who are not 
present or are known only as 
imaginable social types. These 
moments give some sense of the 
intense, dense and protracted nature of 
the work going into the preparation of 
a computational infrastructure that may 
potentially enable the transformation of 
discovering work in a science like 
biology through enabling this to take 
place on line. 
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